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Motivation 
Policymakers around the world lure multinational enterprises in order to boost productivity 
and growth. However, poor and small host countries may have little to offer to attract FDI 
– except perhaps abundant and cheap labor. Furthermore, by aggressively competing for 
FDI, policymakers may in effect engage in a race to the bottom with respect to social 
standards and worker rights.  
We focus on a closely related question: Does it really pay, in terms of attracting 
FDI inflows, for policymakers to keep organized labor in check and be lax in enforcing 
worker rights and labor norms? Previous literature is inconclusive on whether FDI, in order 
to reduce labor costs, goes where social standards are low, worker rights repressed and 
labor  markets  unrestricted.  Violations  of  basic  civil  liberties  and  core  labor  standards 
appear to reduce FDI (e.g., Kucera 2002; Harms and Ursprung 2002; Busse 2003). On the 
other hand, the literature focusing on specific aspects of labor market regulations finds that 
host countries with more flexible labor markets attract more FDI (e.g., Haaland et al. 2003; 
Görg 2005; Javorcik and Spatareanu 2005). 
We attempt to overcome several shortcomings of previous studies. First, we use 
detailed  information  on  labor  rights  violations  related  to  freedom  of  association  and 
collective bargaining. These data, kindly made available by Layna Mosley, help redress 
severe measurement problems when using simplistic measures like the number of ratified 
ILO conventions (Mosley and Uno 2007). Second, previous literature is largely restricted 
to cross-section studies and aggregated FDI flows. By contrast, our FDI gravity analysis 
covers  the  period  1984-2004.  We  avoid  a  potentially  serious  sample  selection  bias  by 
covering 28 source countries of FDI, including non-OECD countries, and 82 low- and 
middle-income host countries. Previous studies typically excluded most small and lower-
income countries with minor (or no) FDI inflows, i.e., exactly those developing countries   3 
for which the question of how to attract FDI is particularly relevant. Third, we isolate the 
effect of labor rights on FDI from other means through which policymakers in developing 
countries attempt to attract FDI. Fourth, in contrast to previous studies, we account for 
potential endogeneity of FDI by performing system GMM estimations. 
 
Data and Method  
Our variable of interest, labor rights (LabR), captures the presence and actual adherence to 
legal rights of workers to organize, bargain collectively and strike. It records 37 specific 
violations of such rights ranging from the absence of legal rights to limitations and the 
breach of legal obligations by governments and employers. The seriousness of violations is 
weighted through expert assessments.
1 Higher scores reflect stronger labor rights in the 
host country of FDI. The sign of  LabR should be negative if repressed labor rights are 
associated  with  higher  FDI  inflows.  The  counterhypothesis  applies  if  multinational 
enterprises are under strict public scrutiny to show good corporate conduct  concerning 
workers  and,  therefore,  shy  away  from  host  countries  with  pervasive  social  injustice 
(Neumayer and De Soysa 2006).  
We control for FDI promotion through bilateral trade agreements (RTA), bilateral 
investment treaties (BIT) and unilateral capital account liberalization (CapOpen). Other 
controls are fairly standard in the literature on FDI determinants: host-country GDP (GDP) 
and GDP growth (Growth) to account for horizontal FDI, the difference in per-capita GDP 
between the source and the host country (DiffGDPpc) to account for vertical FDI, inflation 
                                                            
1 See Kucera (2002) for a detailed account. For our sample of countries, LabR has a mean of 22.3 and a 
(within) standard deviation of 4.36, and ranges from 2.5 to 37.   4 
(Inflation) and openness to trade (Openness) of the host country, and alternative indicators 
of country risk (InvestProfile,  PolRisk).
2  
The basic specification is: 
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where FDIijt stands for the (three-year average of) foreign direct investment by country i in 
(developing)  country  j in  period  t, FDIit for total  FDI of country  i in  all (developing) 
countries included in our sample, Xjt represents a set of host country control variables, Yijt 
denotes the difference between source and host country characteristics, λt is a set of year 
dummies, and LabRjt is the labor rights variable; jt and ijt represent host-year effects and, 
respectively, the error term.  
The definition of the dependent FDI variable in (1) is preferred as it is mainly 
developing  countries  that  may  violate  labor  rights  to  attract  FDI.  Moreover,  the 
“competitive model” of Elkins et al. (2006) suggests that host countries vying for similar 
types of FDI are mainly diverting FDI away from (often neighboring) competitors. 
We use the logarithm of FDI, GDP, DiffGDPpc, and Inflation. To avoid the loss of 
observations with negative values or zeros, we apply the following transformation: 
 
    (2)                                                  1 ln     x x   y
2     
 
                                                            
2 FDI data come from the UNCTAD database on bilateral FDI flows. Apart from BIT (Source: UNCTAD), 
RTA (WTO), and the political risk indicators (International Country Risk Guide), the data on the control 
variables come from the World Bank‟s World Development Indicators.   5 
The sign of x is left unchanged in this way, but the values of x pass from a linear scale at 
small absolute values to a logarithmic scale at large values.
3 
We perform system GMM estimations proposed by Blundell and Bond  (1998) to 
account for potential endogeneity .  The estimator  combines a differenced and a level 
equation. Lagged levels of endogenous variables are used as instruments for contemporary 
differences, and lagged differences are used as instruments for the level equation. 
 
Results 
The coefficients of most controlling variables are statistically significant with the expected 
signs (Table 1). FDI is strongly path dependent, and we find significant evidence for both 
horizontal (GDP; Growth) and vertical FDI (DiffGDPpc). Bilateral agreements (RTA; BIT) 
stimulate FDI, whereas higher country risk (i.e., low values of InvestProfile and PolRisk) 
discourage FDI.
4  
The labor rights variable LabR is highly significantly positive in all specifications. 
This  shows  that  it  is  not  a  promising  option  to  lure  FDI  by  repressing  labor  rights. 
Multinational enterprises prefer host countries where labor rights are respected – either 
because they are concerned about their reputation regarding corporate conduct, or cost 
savings  cannot  be  realized  by  violating  labor  rights.  This  finding  remains  when 
additionally controlling for centralized wage setting in the host country. Note that we do 
                                                            
3 For our preferred FDI variable, negative values are set to zero. We relax this assumption later as we 
introduce another FDI measure. 
4 All estimations pass the Sargan-Hansen-J statistic test for overidentifying restrictions, demonstrating that 
the instruments are valid. The exception is the last specification, which might be due to the significant 
decline in the sample size when including CentralBargaining. The Arellano-Bond test shows that the null 
hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation cannot be rejected.   6 
not  find  evidence  for  the  widely  held  view  that  FDI  is  discouraged  by  centralized 
bargaining on wages (CentralBargaining = 1).
5 
The quantitative effect of LabR on FDI seems rather small (coefficient of 0.00698 
in Model I). Yet if we focus on the long-run effect, we find that an increase in our labor 
rights variable by 4.36 (i.e., the standard deviation of LabR) leads to an increase in the FDI 
measure by 19.6%.
6 
Table 2 presents five robustness tests; we report only the labor rights coefficients to 
save space. First, the effect of  LabR remains significantly positive when redefining the 
dependent FDI variable in absolute terms. Second, redefining our labor rights variable to 
reflect the difference in LabR between the host and the source country shows that better 
labor rights in the host country lead to higher FDI. Third, we return to variable definitions 
as in Table 1, but consider sub-samples of developing host countries. Excluding the largest 
host countries hardly affects our results. Robustness tests 4 and 5 reveal that it is mainly 
for middle-income countries that LabR has a positive effect on FDI. However, it does not 
even pay for low-income countries to repress labor rights, although especially this sub-
group may have little to offer but cheap labor to attract FDI.   
Summing up, we find fairly strong evidence that it does not pay, in terms of higher 
FDI inflows, for policymakers to repress labor rights. Rather, violations of labor rights tend 
to  discourage  FDI  –  even  in  small  and  poor  developing  countries.  More  research  is 
required to determine why exactly multinationals prefer to locate where labor rights are 
respected. This may be due to increasing public scrutiny of corporate conduct. 
                                                            
5 See Leahy and Montagna (2000) for a theoretical model suggesting that FDI is not necessarily attracted by 
decentralized wage bargaining. 
6 The long-run effect is calculated by dividing the coefficient of LabR by one minus the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable times the increase in LabR in percent of the FDI measure. Note that the impact of 
LabR on FDI diminishes as we add further control variables.   7 
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Table 1: FDI Inflows and Labor Rights 
Model:  I  II  III  IV  V 
LabR  0.00698***  0.00523***  0.00407***  0.00293**  0.00454** 
  (5.16)  (4.18)  (2.83)  (2.19)  (2.42) 
lnFDI, lagged  0.844***  0.814***  0.832***  0.800***  0.754*** 
  (25.7)  (26.8)  (29.4)  (25.1)  (22.2) 
lnGDP  0.0598***  0.0545***  0.0451***  0.0447***  0.0787*** 
  (5.85)  (6.04)  (4.94)  (4.67)  (5.43) 
lnDiffGDPpc   0.00723***  0.00556**  0.00809**  0.0105***  0.0204*** 
  (2.66)  (2.02)  (2.50)  (3.12)  (3.22) 
Growth  0.00374***  0.00306***  0.00348*  0.00336*  0.00141 
  (4.16)  (3.53)  (1.78)  (1.77)  (0.35) 
lnInflation  0.00395  0.000569  0.00173  0.00188  0.00380 
  (0.89)  (0.14)  (0.39)  (0.41)  (0.35) 
Openness  -0.000365  0.0000235  -0.000104  -0.000134  0.000137 
  (-1.58)  (0.11)  (-0.52)  (-0.65)  (0.38) 
RTA  0.104**  0.127***  0.123***  0.121***  0.134* 
  (2.44)  (2.98)  (2.80)  (2.62)  (1.83) 
BIT  0.0601**  0.0726***  0.0521**  0.0513**  0.0188 
  (2.42)  (2.86)  (1.99)  (2.00)  (0.47) 
CapOpen    0.00716  0.0113**  0.00540  0.00804 
    (1.59)  (2.28)  (1.04)  (0.79) 
InvestProfile      0.00994**     
      (2.03)     
PolRisk        0.00485***  0.00651*** 
        (4.27)  (3.13) 
CentralBargaining          -0.0469 
          (-1.21) 
Observations  11,745  11,546  10,690  10,690  4,181 
Country pairs  2,287  2,287  2,175  2,175  861 
Sargan (p-value)
1  0.12  0.15  0.13  0.14  0.01 
AB 2 (p-value)
2  0.14  0.14  0.16  0.16  0.52 
Instruments  284  324  351  351  299 
Notes: Estimation based on one-step system-GMM estimator with robust standard errors; corresponding z -
values are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * significant at 1, 5, and 10 % level, respectively. 
1 Sargan-test of 
overidentification. 
2 Arellano-Bond-test  that  second-order  autocorrelation  in  residuals  is  0;  first-order 
autocorrelation is always rejected (not reported); host-year effects and time dummies always included (not 
shown). 
 
Table 2: Robustness Checks: Coefficients for Labor Rights 
Model:  I  II  III  IV  V 
Full developing country sample           
      1. Dependent variable: absolute FDI  0.0109***  0.00776**  0.00872**  0.00726**  0.0140*** 
          flows, logged  (2.98)  (2.27)  (2.28)  (1.96)  (2.61) 
      2. LabR, difference host minus   0.00412***  0.00373***  0.00326***  0.00282***  0.00310* 
          source country  (4.79)  (4.56)  (3.51)  (3.13)  (1.83) 
Reduced samples (all variables as in Table 1)         
      3. Excluding Brazil, China, India  0.00677***  0.00475***  0.00333**  0.00297**  0.00345* 
          and Indonesia  (4.86)  (3.84)  (2.36)  (2.36)  (1.84) 
      4. Middle-income host countries  0.00624***  0.00591***  0.00724***  0.00471***  0.00932*** 
  (3.29)  (3.19)  (3.59)  (2.58)  (3.20) 
      5. Low-income host countries  0.00161  0.00197*  0.00193*  0.00174*  0.00435*** 
  (1.56)  (1.93)  (1.82)  (1.74)  (3.55) 
Notes as for Table 1. 
 